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Abstract 
 The historical fertility transition is the process by which much of Europe and North 
America went from high to low fertility in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This 
transformation is central to recent accounts of long-run economic growth. Prior to the transition, 
women bore as many as eight children each, and the elasticity of fertility with respect to incomes 
was positive.  Today, many women have no children at all, and the elasticity of fertility with 
respect to incomes is zero or even negative. This paper discusses the large literature on the 
historical fertility transition, focusing on what we do and do not know about the process. I stress 
some possible misunderstandings of the demographic literature, and discuss an agenda for future 
work.   
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Prior to the historical fertility transition, which took place in most of Europe and North 
America between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, married women could expect 
eight or more births. Today many women do not have children at all. For centuries, the elasticity 
of fertility with respect to incomes was positive. Today it is zero or even negative. The fertility 
transition forms a major part of the process that brought the European, and later other, economies 
from slow to rapid and sustained growth.  This article discusses the empirical literature on the 
historical fertility transition: what we know and what we still need to learn. 
Current interest in the broad area of demographic behavior and long-run growth reflects 
several intellectual influences, including Robert E. Lucas’s lectures on growth (Lucas (2002)). 
Early efforts in this area usually embed the microeconomic model of fertility decisions developed 
by Gary Becker in a framework that allows feedbacks from the economy to fertility decisions. 
Perhaps the leading paper in this area is Becker et al (1990). A more recent body of research 
focuses explicitly on how economies transition from a “Malthusian” economy of high fertility 
and little growth in per-capita incomes to one in which fertility is much lower and per-capita 
incomes grow rapidly. This “Unified Growth Theory” (hereafter UGT), developed by  Oded 
Galor, David Weil, and others, integrates a microeconomic model of the demand for children 
with feedbacks from a model of growth. Other, related literature either considers fertility and 
growth in a different way, or examines related questions such as the role of children in the labor 
market. 
These discussions have provoked renewed interest in the empirics of the historical 
fertility transition: when and why it took place, and how rapidly it created the low fertility we 
now see in most wealthy countries. Growth theorists are to be commended for trying to explain 
historical fact and  highlight the importance of issues that were previously of interest primarily to 
economic historians and to others, such as demographers, outside the economics profession. 
Unfortunately, some recent discussions misconstrue the demographic literature. The use of 
certain theoretical ideas has also led some to believe that the relevant propositions have actually 
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been tested in historical contexts, when that is unfortunately often not the case. Fully 
understanding the fertility transition will require much more empirical research. This paper has 
two goals. I provide an overview of the historical fertility transition, and then discuss the main 
hypotheses that are current in the economics and economic history literature. Throughout I set 
aside three other issues. First, most current economic research stresses the implications of 
demographic change for economic growth and development. That issue lies beyond the scope of 
this paper. Second, economists typically think of fertility decline as the reduction in the number 
of children born to a woman or to a couple. Demographers and others stress heterogeneity in the 
way fertility declines, for example, whether couples reduce the number of surviving offspring by 
spacing their child-bearing or ending child-bearing before that is biologically necessary. I discuss 
this issue only where important to understanding the evidence on the fertility transition. Finally, 
the fertility transition in developing countries since World War II has been studied far more 
intensively than its historical counterpart. This paper focuses on the earlier, historical episode, 
which is most relevant to what theorists have in mind when modeling the Industrial Revolution. 
 
1. The basic contours of the historical fertility transition 
Figure 1 reports fertility experience for the period 1800-1970 for five major countries: 
France, England and Wales, Germany, the United States, and Italy. The measure reported in 
Figure 1 is the Crude Birth Rate (CBR), defined as the number of births per thousand per annum. 
This paper focuses on the first four countries; Italy is included in Figure 1 only to suggest the 
heterogeneity of historical experience. Figure 2 focuses on the single case of Germany to 
highlight the relationship between fertility and mortality decline.1  Ignoring the heterogeneity in 
Figure 1 for the moment, we see fertility declining starting in the eighteenth or nineteenth 
century, and this decline accelerates in the second half of the nineteenth century. The two world 
                                                 
1 Deaths in Figure 2 are reported as the Crude Death Rate, defined analogously to CBR. The Crude Rate of 
Natural Increase (CRNI) is defined as CBR – CDR. 
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wars produced dramatic, temporary reductions in fertility, and the post-World War II period saw 
a “Baby Boom.” By the 1970s most of Western Europe experienced the emergence of “low-low” 
fertility. Today, some OECD countries have fertility rates too low to sustain population growth 
through natural increase alone.2 The relationship between fertility and mortality declines differs 
across these countries, but the German experience detailed in Figure 2 is fairly typical. For most 
of the nineteenth century, birth rates exceeded death rates and population grew (even with, as in 
the German case, extensive emigration). This is no longer true; for much of the late twentieth 
century, German rates of natural increase were negative. 
Most countries outside Europe and North America did not experience fertility declines 
until after World War II. Timing within Europe and North America is less clear. Some 
economists have accepted the view that the fertility transition took place all at once across 
Europe. Most economists would not admire the data and methods upon which that assertion is 
based.3 The all-at-once view has important implications for causality. Some scholars invoke the 
claim of simultaneous fertility transitions to support their view that economics has little to do 
with the fertility transition:4 “Clearly the simultaneity and speed of the European transition makes 
it highly doubtful that any economic force could be found which was powerful enough to offer a 
reasonable explanation” (Cleland and Wilson (1987, p.18)).  
 Figures 1 and 2 report national aggregates. Several studies document the existence of 
fertility control among small groups as early as the seventeenth century. These “forerunners” were 
                                                 
2 Kohler, Billari, and Ortega (2002) discuss the emergence of very low fertility in the 1990s; Goldstein, 
Sobotka, and Jasilione (2009) discuss a recent, partial reversal. 
3 Galor (2005, Footnote 33) accepts the view that the fertility transition began everywhere at once in 
Europe. He is citing the results of a large project undertaken at Princeton University in the 1960s and 
1970s. The Princeton conclusion reflects problems with sources, measures, and econometrics. The 
Princeton project devised a series of indices of overall fertility, marital fertility, illegitimate fertility, and 
the contribution of marriage patterns to fertility. The index of marital fertility Ig is scaled such that it would 
equal one if the population in question had fertility equal to the very high level of the Hutterites in the 
1920s. See Appendix B to Coale and Watkins (1986) for definitions. Ig does not perform in Monte Carlo 
studies as claimed (Guinnane, Okun and Trussell (1994); Brown and Guinnane (2007). This index’s 
performance is crucial to the claim that fertility started to decline everywhere at once. 
4 Thus it is puzzling to find an economic historian claiming, counter to the evidence, that “… the timing of 
the demographic transition in Europe and the United States places it circa 1890…” Clark (2007, p. 225).   
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usually urban elites or members of minority groups such as Jews (Livi-Bacci (1986)). More 
generally, research based on either sub-national aggregates or micro data often find earlier fertility 
declines than in national data. The Princeton studies report earlier fertility declines in cities, for 
example, but stress the behavior of national populations. Knodel (1988) reports that couples married 
1800-24 in five of the fourteen German villages he studied exhibited significant control of marital 
fertility. 
There are more general reasons for skepticism about simultaneous fertility transitions. 
Most scholars agree that France’s fertility decline started in the early nineteenth century at the 
latest. Weir (1994, Table B3)’s careful construction of the Princeton indices shows that the 
decline in French  fertility began in the late eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century, 
U.S. birthrates were higher than elsewhere, but falling rapidly.  By the end of the nineteenth 
century U.S. fertility fell below that of much of Western Europe. France and the United States are 
not esoteric exceptions one can ignore.5 
Another concern reflects the CBR so often relied upon in economics research. In many 
circumstances it is the only measure available, or, as in my Figure 1, the only measure available 
that is defined consistently across a set of countries for the right period. Yet it has serious 
weaknesses, especially applied to this period of rapid economic and demographic change. The 
CBR does not account for age-structure or marriage patterns, both of which changed significantly 
in some European populations during this period. Consider England and Wales, where from 1871 
to 1911 there was a disproportionate increase in the number of women of child-bearing age.  The 
overall population increased by about 60 percent, while the female population aged 15-44 
increased by 77 percent. The shift in age-structure in the absence of a fertility reduction would 
have increased the CBR by 11 percent. By failing to take into account the changing population 
                                                 
5 Hacker (2003) questions whether the U.S. really had an early fertility decline. He is right to stress the 
weakness of the sources for the early nineteenth century, but the methods he prefers are fragile in their own 
way, and even he suggests a U.S. fertility transition well before the late nineteenth century. 
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age-structure, the Crude Birth Rate understates the change in behavior.6 Some European societies 
experienced significant changes in marriage patterns during this period that  make the CBR a 
poor guide to marital fertility. For example, between 1871 and 1911, the proportion of English 
women who had never married by ages 25-29 rose from .37 to .44 (Hajnal 1953, Table 3). Mean 
age at marriage for English males rose over the same period by 1.2 years (to 27.6), while at the 
same time in Germany it fell  by nearly 1 year (to 27.9). The changes for women are similar but 
slightly less pronounced (Ehmer 1991, Table 1).7 
 Figure 3 reports a better measure, the Cohort Fertility Rate (CFR) for the five countries 
in Figure 1. CFR is the average number of children born to women in a given cohort, and thus 
requires age-specific fertility for a cohort’s entire reproductive life. Its cross-section analogue, the 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR), is the sum of current age-specific fertilities, and thus reports the 
number of children born to a woman who experiences current age-specific fertility throughout her 
life. Reliable data needed to compute the CFR do not go back very far into the nineteenth century, 
and are not available even then for most countries. But Figure 3 suffices to suggest that the 
experience of specific cohorts born in the nineteenth century is not well-captured by CBR.8 What 
looks like constant fertility (as measured by the CBR) may well reflect two offsetting trends. 
Figure 4 uses the exceptional French data to illustrate just this point: France’s precocious marital 
fertility decline was partially offset by a mid-century marriage boom. 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 This precise effect is not present in every population represented in Figure 1. This is the point. The figures 
in question come from the decennial censuses of England and Wales for 1871 and 1911, and the Registrar-
General’s reports on births, deaths, and marriages. I have taken them from Mitchell (1980, Series B1, B2, 
B5, and B6). 
7 Cross-sectional differences in marriage patterns at the time were especially large. In 1900, England and 
Ireland had about the same Crude Birth Rate, but the latter was achieved by relatively few couples having 
very large familes (Guinnane 1997). 
8 TFR estimates for the United States start at 7.04 in 1800 and fall to 3.56 by 1900. These figures, just like 
the CBR in Figure 1, are for the white population only (Haines (2000a, Table 4.3)).  
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2. From Malthus to Becker    
Most of the literature uses Malthusian models to understand the relationship between 
population and the economy before the fertility transition, and views the fertility transition as an 
escape from the Malthusian world.  Figure 5 shows that escape: until the early nineteenth century, 
there was a positive relationship between fertility and the real wage in England and Wales. Then 
the relationship breaks down: higher wages, the product of capital accumulation and 
technological change, no longer translated into higher fertility. 
Two distinct approaches to the Malthusian world exist in the literature. An older version 
stresses Malthus’s own argument, that is, that the regulation of births reflected the regulation of 
marriage. In this model marital fertility depends only on age at marriage and the proportions who 
marry. The lifetime fertility of any given woman is a stochastic function of her age at marriage. 
Central to this version of the Malthusian model is the “European marriage pattern” in which 
young adults deferred marriage until well after puberty, often into their middle and late twenties, 
and as much as ten to twenty percent of some cohorts never married at all. Couples could not 
marry until they could support themselves and their offspring, implying that marriage decisions 
depended on the real wage in young adulthood.9 In this version of the Malthusian model, the 
fertility transition reflects a shift from controlling marriage to controlling fertility within 
marriage. More recently, many economists (and much of the recent growth theory) set aside the 
marriage issue and thus model fertility without concern for its underlying determinants.10   
Estimating long-run versions of the  Malthusian model poses serious  challenges. It has 
three equations and three endogenous variables, and because of echo effects due to past 
                                                 
9 Most studies find a substantial proportion of pregnant brides, but children actually born outside of 
marriage rarely accounted for more than 5 percent of all births. For the European marriage pattern, see 
Hajnal (1965, 1982). Most scholars accept Hajnal’s European Marriage Pattern as a stylized account, but it 
is not clear which parts of Europe it describes. Wrigley and Schofield (1981)’s book is an extended 
argument that England’s demographic system functioned in a particularly benign way because of the 
strength of the relationship between the real wage and marriage patterns. Earlier studies had stressed 
mortality changes as the driving force in English population history. Malthusian models in Chinese 
population history are more controversial, partly because Chinese marriage patterns appear to have been 
different. Lee and Feng (1999) provide an overview of the debate and references to the literature.  
10 This vision underlies Galor and Weil (2000), as well as most other UGT models.  
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population shocks, the demographic fluctuations of today may represent the effects of past 
shocks. Another literature avoids these problems by estimating the short-run elasticities of births, 
marriages, and deaths to real-wage shocks. The short-run models confirm the central role of 
nuptiality in regulating fertility.11 
 
The demand for children 
 Virtually all economic analysis of fertility today starts from Becker’s model of the 
demand for children.12 Becker’s insight was to analyze the demand for children using the tools of 
consumer choice. The model yields important insights for the fertility transition. Observers have 
long noted that fertility tends to be negatively correlated with income in the cross-section, and, 
since the beginnings of the fertility transition, over time. Becker’s model implies that this is a 
standard substitution effect, that children are not inferior goods: wealthier couples have higher 
opportunity costs of time, and time is a major cost of child-rearing. The simple version of 
Becker’s model starts with a household utility function U=U(n,Z), where n is the number of 
children and Z is a vector of all other commodities. The household maximizes this utility subject 
to a standard budget constraint. Increases in child costs induce substitution away from children 
and towards the Zs.  A pure increase in income raises the number of children demanded, as we 
expect. But if that higher income reflects rising wages, then that increased wage may show up as 
                                                 
11 The age-structure change in England noted above is one such echo effect. Lee and Anderson (2002) rely 
on a state-space representation to contend with the integration and endogeneity problems implied by the 
model. This paper presents a clear overview of earlier literature as well as the modeling problems at issue. 
More recently, Nicolini (2007) relies on a simple VAR model that he identifies by an assumption of 
“contemporaneous stickiness.” Møller and Sharp (2008) are unusual in the recent literature in explicitly 
modeling marriage rates. There are also data reasons to prefer the short-run model: often for historical 
situations we know the number of events (births, deaths, marriages) but not the population size, and thus 
cannot compute demographic rates. Lee (1981, 1985) explains the logic of the short-run models. Weir 
(1984) used this approach to challenge Wrigley and Schofield’s interpretation of their English evidence. 
Guinnane and Ogilvie (2008) apply this approach to some German villages for the period 1634-1870 and 
provide references to other efforts of this sort. 
12 The important paper references are Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973). Becker (1981, Chapter 
5) is a more elegant and expansive exposition. 
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an opportunity cost of having children, and reduce the number of children demanded via the 
substitution effect.13 
Later interest in Becker’s model focuses on the possible trade-off between the number of 
children and their quality, usually called the Quantity/Quality or “Q-Q” model. (Child quality is 
usually taken to mean child’s health or education.) The Q-Q model starts from a household utility 
function of the form U(n,q,Z), where q is the quality of each child. Becker (1981, pp.107-108) 
divides child costs into three categories. Some costs depend only on the number of children: an 
example of this, pn, would be the costs associated with the mother’s pregnancy and delivery.14 
Another cost is related to child quality, but does not depend on the number of children, as it goes 
to purchase household public goods: examples of pq include books that children could share. A 
final cost, pc, is the cost of augmenting the quality of any child. The household’s budget constraint 
is then: 
  (1) 
where I is household income and  πz is the price  of the Zs. The marginal rate of substitution 
between quantity and quality now depends on  the ratios of fixed to variable costs for quantity 
and quality respectively, as well as on the ratio of marginal variable cost to the average variable 
cost of quality. The substitution effects between quantity and quality are stronger in the Q-Q 
model than in the original Becker model.  Consider an increase in pn. The household will 
substitute away from numbers to both child quality and Zs, as one would expect. But because of 
that interaction term , the shadow cost of n depends on q, so a reduction in child numbers 
raises the shadow cost of numbers even more, inducing more substitution of quality for quantity.  
 This Q-Q model has considerable appeal in historical circumstances. We observe sharp 
fertility declines that seem to reflect small changes in the economic environment. For example, as 
                                                 
13 In a number of articles often called collectively the “Easterlin synthesis,” Richard Easterlin integrated 
Becker’s approach with a better appreciation of the costs of fertility control as well as the biological limits 
on reproduction. See especially Easterlin (1978). 
14 This discussion follows Becker (1981) and uses his notation. 
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Becker noted himself, within this model a modest reduction in the cost of contraception could 
induce a shift from n to q, which seems consistent with the historical evidence. Several recent 
papers use historical data to test the Q-Q model. Becker et al (2009) use toughening of 
compulsory schooling laws in Prussia in the late 1840s to study the fertility effects of a reduction 
in the price of child quality. In their district-level data, areas with higher enrollment rates had 
lower fertility. This finding seems consistent with the central tradeoff in the Q-Q model. Bleakley 
and Lange (2009) take a different approach. They examine a program that largely eradicated 
intestinal worms among children in the early twentieth-century U.S. South. They find that the 
reduction in the prevalence of worms, which they interpret as a shock to the cost of child quality, 
increased school enrollment rates and reduced fertility. This again is consistent with the Q-Q 
model.15 
  
3. Explanations and evidence 
We can group the many economic explanations offered for the historical fertility 
transition under six headings.  The first is an exogenous decline in infant and child mortality. The 
second turns on innovations in the technology of contraception, or more widespread availability 
of contraceptive devices. The third looks for increases in the direct cost of childbearing. The 
fourth explanation is based on changes in the opportunity costs of child-bearing. The fifth looks 
for a net increase in returns to child quality. The sixth argument assumes that children were an 
important way to ensure against risk and to provide for old age, and that the rise of state social 
insurance as well as private insurance and savings vehicles led households to substitute out of 
children. We consider these explanations in ceteris paribus fashion.  
 
 
                                                 
15 The Q-Q model may get more attention that it warrants. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) show that 
Becker’s original model (with   constrained to zero) generates nearly all of the testable implications 
that are identified with the Q-Q model. See also Schulze (1981, pp.166-169). 
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“Demographic transition theory” and the role of mortality decline 
A long tradition assigned to mortality decline a causal role in the fertility transition. 
Frank Notestein (1945) argued that couples in high-mortality societies have a lot of births to 
ensure a surviving brood of the desired size. An exogenous mortality decline induces couples to 
have fewer children because they do not need so many “spares.”  Notestein’s account was 
motivated by the experience of developing countries after World War II, where public-health 
interventions first reduced infant and child mortality, and in some places those developments 
were followed by declines in fertility. Most European countries also experienced a significant 
mortality decline in the nineteenth century.  Historians and others still debate the causes of the 
historical mortality decline, but most scholars stress some combination of better food supplies, 
improvements in public health systems (such as clean water supplies and food-safety measures), 
and  modest results from medical interventions (such as vaccines against smallpox).16 Some of 
these developments reflect local decisions about public-good investments, but it is plausible to 
view them as largely exogenous to any couple’s decision-making. 
This mortality decline was concentrated in the early years of life. A woman born in the 
United States in 1850 had an expectation of life of 39.4 years. A five-year-old girl in that year had 
an expectation of life of 50.8 years, and a twenty year-old could expect to live an additional 39.8 
years. In 1910 these figures were nearly the same for those who had already survived the 
dangerous early years. A newborn girl could expect to live 54.7 years, and a five-year-old girl, 
57.4 years. A twenty year-old woman could expect a further 40.7 years, not even a full year more 
than in 1850.17   
                                                 
16 Thomas McKeown (1976) argued that prior to about 1900, medical science had done little to increase 
human longevity, and concluded that the observed mortality declines to that point reflected direct and 
indirect effects of better nutrition brought about by higher incomes and better food supplies. Fogel (2004)’s 
more nuanced account also stresses the role of nutrition. For an introduction and overview to this issue see 
Angus Deaton’s review of Fogel’s book, Journal of Economic Literature 44(1): 106-114. 
17 Historical Statistics of the United States series Ab657, 659 and 661. Mortality figures for the United 
States are complicated by the lack of complete death registration statistics, but the basic patterns noted in 
the text are robust. 
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The Notestein argument does not fit the timing of the historical declines in fertility and 
mortality. Fertility in the United States declined for decades before any noticeable decline in 
mortality. The Total Fertility Rates (TFR) reported by Haines (2000b, Table 8.2) decline from the 
early nineteenth century; there is no sustained fall in the infant mortality rate, on the other hand, 
until the 1890s. French experience was similar, with a fertility transition preceding mortality 
declines. In other places, such as Germany (Figure 2), the fertility and mortality declines took 
place at roughly the same time. This does not rule out a role for exogenous changes in mortality 
as a causal force, of course, but it suggests that Notestein-style account explains only part of the 
change. The total fertility rate in the U.S. in the early nineteenth century was about seven. Even if 
thirty percent of children then died in infancy or childhood, this implies that households wanted a 
surviving brood of four or five. By the end of the nineteenth century, in contrast, white, urban 
women in the U.S. were increasingly having just two children (David and Sanderson (1987)). 
 “Demographic transition theory” also has two theoretical flaws. Part of the decline in 
infant and child mortality is endogenous to the fertility decline. There are several lines of 
argument here, all of which assume that parents can assert some influence on their children’s 
mortality risks by providing health-enhancing resources. In a historical context these resources 
include breast-feeding (which costs mother’s time, but isolates an infant from possibly 
contaminated water and food supplies), other nutrition, and protection from danger such as hearth 
fires.18 In the Q-Q model, reduced infant and child mortality could also reflect changes in other 
costs. For example, improved contraceptive technology (discussed next) could allow parents to 
more tightly control the link between actual and desired fertility. Parents might have a smaller 
                                                 
18 Historical research has not always taken this issue seriously. Papers that do instrument for infant 
mortality in econometric analysis generally find that it dramatically reduces the apparent impact of 
mortality in an OLS framework. See Galloway, Hammel, and Lee (1998b), which also surveys earlier 
literature; Brown and Guinnane (2002); Murphy (2010a).  
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number of children and care for them more intensively, in effect not relying on high mortality to 
cull their brood to its desired size.19  
The second theoretical problem with the “demographic transition” account is that even a 
fully exogenous reduction in infant mortality would have two, countervailing effects. An 
exogenous mortality decline reduces pn and thus makes child numbers cheaper relative to both 
child quality and Zs. An exogenous mortality decline could actually raise fertility net of child 
mortality. 
 
Innovations in contraceptive methods 
A second explanation for the fertility transition implies that couples long wanted smaller 
families, and improvements in contraceptive methods made that goal easier to achieve. Assessing 
this explanation is frustrated by lack of direct evidence on contraceptive practice for most of the 
period. The best we can do is to provide a broad characterization of those technologies and the 
constraints they put on couples. Indirect evidence shows that until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, most fertility control relied on a combination of withdrawal (coitus 
interruptus) and abstinence from sexual relations.20 The first “modern” methods appeared in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. These techniques relied partly on advances in medical 
                                                 
19 If this claim seems extreme, consider the practice of wet-nursing, which was extensive in France into the 
late nineteenth century. In many cases, one woman would take several urban babies soon after their birth, 
and travel with them by train to the location where they would be cared for. Some babies would die en 
route, from cold or hunger, and others would die from neglect at their destination.  The practice was 
widespread and not limited to urban middle and upper classes. Rollet (1982, Table 1) estimates that about 
ten percent of all French newborns, and about thirty percent of those born in the Paris region, were sent to a 
wet nurse in the late nineteenth century. Martin-Fugier (1978, pp. 26-27) quotes a thirty percent mortality 
rate for wet-nursed infants in the Paris region earlier in the century. This is roughly twice the infant 
mortality rate for France as a whole at the time.  
20 McLaren (1978, pp.25-27) among others notes that frequent condemnations of withdrawal in the 
eighteenth century suggest that the practice was already used as a form of contraception. Woycke (1988, 
p.11) concludes that throughout the nineteenth century, “…it was coitus interruptus that remained the most 
common contraceptive practice.”  Santow (1995) provides the best recent account of this issue. The 
nineteenth century also witnessed the spread of “marriage manuals,” a euphemism for guides to sexuality, 
sexual health, and contraception. These guides appeared as early as the eighteenth century, although their 
circulation was at first limited (McLaren 1978, pp.26-30). The usefulness of such guides in limiting fertility 
of course depends on their information being more accurate than what couples already knew from other 
sources. 
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understanding, but also on the invention of vulcanized rubber (in 1844). Applied to the 
production of condoms (in 1855), this new industrial process allowed couples to replace 
expensive and relatively unreliable condoms made from natural materials. (Most studies, in fact, 
conclude that prior to vulcanization, condoms were intended to prevent the spread of disease, not 
pregnancy). Depending on the place, condoms were widely available in barber shops, drug stores 
and other retail outlets. Vulcanized rubber was also the basis for the introduction of the 
diaphragm and similar barrier methods in the later nineteenth century.  
 Thus we have a new set of technologies, which would make contraception easier and 
more reliable, introduced not long before we observe the actual fertility decline in some countries 
(but well after France and the U.S.).  Michael and Willis (1976) first integrated the costs of 
averting unwanted births into the microeconomic model. Their model assumes that couples can 
affect births, which is a random variable, using methods that imply various utility and money 
costs. The couple’s optimization takes into account both the costs of contraception and the utility 
costs of having “too few” or “too many” children. (Thus the Q-Q tradeoff enters their thinking 
indirectly; a couple with too many children may, because of the budget constraint, be forced to 
choose a lower level of quality than preferred). Any contraceptive method implies both fixed 
costs (which must be “paid” to use the method at all) and a marginal cost (which depends on the 
number of births averted). A couple that wanted to avert three of an expected eight births would 
be happier with a relatively high marginal cost approach than would a couple that wanted to avert 
all but two of eight expected births.  
The U.S. and many European countries at first made concerted efforts to limit the spread 
of contraceptive knowledge and technologies. In the United States, the “Comstock Laws,” a 
collection of state and federal statutes, made it illegal to disseminate both marriage manuals and 
contraceptive devices such as condoms. Similar measures were enacted in England, Germany, 
and many other European countries. The focus and practical enforcement of such laws were 
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uneven, and in some cases, celebrated court cases probably advanced public knowledge of 
contraceptive methods. The policies could also be self-contradictory.21  
The effects of these restrictions on the fertility transition are not really known. 
Demographers today tend to argue that the availability of contraceptives and contraceptive 
information is the most important barrier to fertility decline in developing countries.22 
Economists are more skeptical, stressing the incentives to reduce family sizes. In any case, three 
sets of useful surveys confirm that throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
withdrawal and abstinence remained the primary approaches used by married couples.23 Since 
these technologies had been available, essentially, throughout human history, it is unlikely that 
the condom and similar new methods played a strong role in the fertility transition. Legal 
restrictions probably mattered less than cost. Rubber condoms were at first expensive. Brown 
(2009, p.15) estimates that in the early twentieth century, a year’s supply of condoms cost a 
Berlin worker the equivalent of ten to fifteen days of work. Other barrier methods such as the 
diaphragm required the attention of a trained medical professional.24 Cost may account in part for 
Santow (1993)’s finding that coitus interruptus remained widely-used well into the twentieth 
                                                 
21 Germany’s Lex Heinze (1900) illustrates the point nicely. This Act made illegal any public display or 
advertisement of objects intended for “obscene” use. But retailers could still sell condoms and other 
devices. At the same time, two other important German institutions, the Army and the Sickness Funds, 
were doing their best to encourage the use of condoms to stop the spread of venereal disease. Bailey (2010) 
is one of the few careful empirical studies of the Comstock Laws, but deals with a period, the 1960s and 
later, that is well after the U.S. fertility transition. She concludes (p.122) that in 1965, without the bans in 
place, marital fertility in the affected states would have been eight percent lower. 
22 This view underlies the literature on the so-called KAP-gap. In many surveys in developing countries, a 
significant number of women report that they do not want any more children but are not using 
contraception, or that they had more children than they actually wanted. The precise reasons for this are 
debated, but many demographers think this fact reflects lack of access to contraceptives. Westoff (1988) is 
an early, somewhat skeptical view. See also Bongaarts (1991). The publications of the Alan Guttmacher 
Institute, on the other hand, argue that there is considerable “unmet need for contraception” today. See, for 
example, “Facts on Satisfying the Need for Contraception in Developing Countries,” April 2010. 
23 Three sets of surveys, some of doctors and some of women or couples directly, all conclude that the 
primary techniques used by married couples were withdrawal and abstinence. See Brown (2009, Table 1) 
for a summary of three German surveys from the early twentieth century; David and Sanderson (1986, pp. 
317-328) discuss the Mosher survey of American women born in the 1850s and 1860s, as well as later U.S. 
surveys; Jütte (2003, p.220) discusses a survey of French doctors from the 1890s. 
24 The contraceptive pill used today dates from the 1950s, with its first widespread use taking place in the 
1960s. Historical sources also refer to efforts to induce abortion. Given social and later legal views of this 
practice, we cannot hope to know how common abortion really was during the period of the transition.  
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century, even in countries where alternatives were available. The methods available even prior to 
the fertility transition were sufficient to produce voluntary reductions of the magnitude we 
observe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. David and Sanderson (1986) develop a 
model of a couple’s lifetime fertility as a renewal process, and use it to derive estimates of the 
number of live births a couple would experience in a twenty-year marriage under various 
assumptions about coital frequency and contraceptive failure rates. Their baseline couple (no 
contraception) would have about nine births if they had sexual intercourse, on average, five times 
per 24-day cycle. If this couple used a method with a 12.5 percent failure rate, and failed to use it 
about 10 percent of the time, they would have only three births in twenty years. This “method” 
approximates what we know about the use of coitus interruptus in modern populations. 
Conscientious use of condoms would get the couple below one birth.25 
 
Increases in the direct costs of children 
In the Q-Q model, increases in pn induce substitution towards both child quality and the Z 
goods directly, and towards quality through the interaction term in the budget constraint. One 
logical possibility to explain the fertility transition is that the direct costs of child-bearing changed 
in ways that induced couples to have smaller families. The problem is that most costs did not 
                                                 
25 Their model is based on Sheps and Menken (1973) and assumes that couples follow the same strategy 
over their entire lifetime. Michael and Willis (1976, Table 2) report a similar exercise using different 
parameter values. The unwary economist may fall into a trap created by the way most demographers think 
of fertility control. To most demographers, the term “family limitation” does not mean a reduction in 
family size, it means a reduction in family size achieved in a particular way. A couple seeking to have only 
N children can adopt a “stopping” strategy (have N children before initiating any effort to restrict fertility) 
or a “spacing” strategy (reduce the probability of a birth right from the start of marriage, and thus spread 
out births throughout the fertility years of the marriage). Most studies in historical demography assume that 
only stopping is legitimate evidence of fertility control; evidence of smaller families achieved via spacing is 
attributed to motivations unrelated to family size. The reasons for this assumption lie beyond the scope of 
this paper, but amount to a concern about identification (see Henry (1961)). Many historical demographers 
also view rudimentary fertility control techniques as unsuited to a spacing strategy; dynamic models of 
family-building, one the other hand, imply that risk-averse couples using unreliable contraceptive methods 
will prefer spacing to stopping (David, Mroz, and Wachter (1987)). Several empirical studies show that 
spacing was actually widespread in the early stages of the fertility transition (see Bean, Mineau, and 
Anderton (1990) and Mroz and Weir (1990)). The development of more reliable fertility control techniques 
in the nineteenth century could well have caused  stopping to replace spacing. Works relying on the 
demographer’s definition would identify a shift to stopping as the onset of the fertility transition. 
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change, over the relevant period, in ways that would produce the observed fertility decline. Most 
households in this period devoted the bulk of their expenditure to food, clothing, and housing. 
The real price of clothing dropped dramatically following the technological innovations of the 
Industrial Revolution, many of which were in textiles. Food prices varied over time and place, 
and protective tariffs on agricultural goods could raise the price of food in one country above its 
counterpart in others. But in general, food prices declined, which at a crude level would imply a 
reduction in pn. 
The only significant increases in direct costs took place because of urbanization. Most 
European countries as well as the United States experienced rapid urbanization during the 
nineteenth century. About six percent of the U.S. population lived in an urban place in 1800; in 
1900 that was nearly forty percent (Haines 2000, Table 4.2). England was already very urban in 
1801 (34 percent), and became even more so over the nineteenth century. By 1911, 79 percent of 
the English population lived in an urban center (Woods 1996, (Table 3)). France started out the 
period less urban, and while its cities did grow, it remained less urban than England or Germany. 
Urbanization in Germany was especially rapid in late nineteenth century. Germans living in 
places with fewer than 2000 people fell from 64 to 40 percent of the population between 1871 
and 1910 (Wehler 1995, Table 71). In urban areas, housing costs exceeded costs in rural areas, 
but of course the decision to live in a city was up to a couple. Most studies find that urban fertility 
was lower than rural fertility in the nineteenth century, although the precise causation has not 
been established. Knodel (1974, Table 3.2) reports that marital fertility in Berlin in 1867-68 was 
about 87 percent of that in rural Prussia; by 1905-06, Berlin’s fertility was half of rural Prussia’s 
and Prussian cities overall had fertility about 75 percent of rural Prussia’s.  Haines (1989, Table 
2) estimates TFR in the urban U.S. in 1905-1910 at about 2.7, with rural nonfarm TFR at 4.0 and 
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rural farm TFR at 6.0. Once the fertility transition began, fertility usually fell first in urban areas, 
with rural areas then catching up.26  
A second type of direct costs underlies a literature that started with the U.S. fertility 
transition. Richard Easterlin’s (1976) famous explanation for the fertility decline in rural America 
rests on the rising costs of farmland as an area was settled. Suppose a farm couple wanted to 
establish each child on a farm similar to their own. As the price of local farmland rose, parents 
either had to send their children further west, where land was cheaper, or had to have fewer 
children. Easterlin argues that parents preferred to have fewer children and be able to settle them 
locally. He dates the beginning of the decline in New York State to 1805 and even Iowa, much 
further west, to 1835.27 Later research focuses on Easterlin’s assumption that parents wanted to 
give each child a fixed bequest. Sundstrom and David (1988), for example, motivate their 
regression analysis using a bargaining model that presumes that a primary motivation for child-
rearing is support in old age. In equilibrium, children can drive a harder bargain with their parents 
if they can point to better, off-farm opportunities. Cross-sectional regressions for U.S. states in 
1840 show that fertility is negatively correlated with measures of non-farm labor-market 
opportunities. Once such proxies are introduced, land prices have no influence on fertility.28 
Child labor raises another source of variation in direct costs. In many societies children 
offset some of the direct costs to their parents by working either in parental income-generation 
activities (such as a farm) or by working in the labor market. Any change in children’s earnings 
would clearly alter the net costs to their parents. Two important trends affected children’s 
earnings opportunities during the period in question. Most accounts imply that industrialization at 
first increased income-earning opportunities for children, because new technologies did not 
                                                 
26 Sharlin (1986) surveys urban-rural differences in European fertility, using the Princeton project’s data. 
27 His fertility measure is the child-woman ratio, or the number of children age 0-9 per thousand women 
16-44. This measure is sensitive to in- and outmigration of both children and adults, as well as to variations 
in infant and child mortality. 
28 Carter et al (1994) provide additional evidence on this debate. This type of argument illustrates the 
problems with defining child quality. One could argue that Easterlin’s explanation is one where parents 
reduce child numbers when the costs of quality increased. 
18 
 
require physical strength. By the 1830s large minorities of English children were working. 
Nardinelli (1990, Table 4.2) reports that in most English counties, at least one-quarter of children 
aged 10-14 were reported in the workforce. Some parts of the textile sector depended heavily on 
children. One Parliamentary inquiry reported that in cotton textiles, half of all workers were under 
18, and 6.8 percent were under 10 (Nardinelli 1990, Table 5.3). Wehler (1996, p. 254) notes that 
in German factories in this period, children could be fifteen percent of the workforce. Estimates 
for industrializing New England run even higher. 
 By the mid-nineteenth century, the use of children, especially in industry, became 
controversial. Governments imposed age restrictions and other measures that reduced children’s 
earning opportunities. The British “Factory Acts,” starting in 1833, imposed restrictions on the 
ages of children who could work, and how many hours they could work. But they started at a 
modest level; the 1833 Act restricted children aged 9-12 to forty-eight hour weeks. Prussia 
introduced similar measures in 1839, with other German states soon following (Wehler (1996, p. 
257)).  Many governments tied restrictions on child labor to an education requirement. The 
English Factory Acts required that child workers also be in school. In some cases, the factory had 
to set up its own school to continue employing children (Nardinelli 1990, pp. 106-7). The 
Prussian 1839 Act established a minimum work age of nine years, and sixteen years for children 
who had not yet had at least three years of schooling. In Massachusetts as of 1837, manufacturers 
could not employ anyone under the age of 15 who had not attended school at least three months 
in the previous year (Moehling 1999, p. 74).  
There are two styles of explanation for the new child-labor laws. One is that a 
combination of social-welfare concerns, along with representatives of labor concerned about 
competition with adult males, overwhelmed industrialists’ opposition to child-labor restrictions. 
The other explanation is that these measures were enacted when industry no longer opposed 
them; either it had become easy to substitute capital and other sorts of labor for child labor, or the 
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workforce had already changed in ways that the new laws were not a binding constraint when 
passed.29 
Child-labor restrictions potentially reduce the incentive to have a large family, but we 
have to bear in mind their limitations. Most such measures either did not apply to agricultural 
work, or did so in a more relaxed way. Wehler (1996) emphasizes that the German restrictions 
did not successfully limit the role of children in production at home, which remained important 
throughout the nineteenth century. And in every case, the restrictions’ impact would depend both 
on enforcement measures and parents’ desire to evade them. Finally, if child-labor restrictions 
were introduced when they were mostly irrelevant, then they could not be a strong causal force in 
the fertility transition.  
   
Increases in the opportunity costs of child-bearing 
Industrialization usually changed the role of women in the workforce, although economic 
historians do not agree on just how. Several studies show that women played important roles in 
factory work early in the industrialization process, but became a less important part of that labor 
force as time went on. In a few industries such as textiles, women were certainly quite numerous 
into the twentieth century. Horrell and Humphries (1995, Table I) estimate wives’ labor-force 
participation rates of about 65 percent for England in the period 1787-1815, which corresponds to 
the height of the Industrial Revolution. This figure appears to fall in the late nineteenth century. 
Most other accounts report women as a proportion of the workforce in particular industries.30  In 
Britain in 1851, women constituted about thirty percent of the country’s measured labor force, 
and about forty percent of all employed women worked in textiles and clothing (Bythell 1993, p. 
35). Goldin and Sokoloff  (1982, Table 3) estimate that women comprised 20-30 percent of the 
workforce in New England textile factories in 1820, and about twice that in 1832. Saxonhouse 
                                                 
29 Moehling (1999) argues the latter for the United States and gives references to the debate.  
30 Historical censuses do a poor job of reporting women’s occupations, especially married women’s 
occupations. Horrell and Humphries (1995) base their study on family budgets.  
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and Wright (1984, Table 1) report that 57.6 percent of the workforce in cotton textiles in the 
American South in 1880 were female. Wehler (1996, p. 254) reports that women could be half the 
workforce in some German factories in the 1830s and 1840s; in 1875, according to the census, 
women constituted nearly half of the workforce in textile and clothing factories in Germany, and 
about twenty percent of industrial workers overall.31 
Married women certainly worked prior to the industrial revolution, but industrial work 
created new opportunities and trade-offs for women. It offered better-paying work that could not 
be combined with child-minding; a woman spinning yarn at home could also care for children, 
while a woman working in a textile factory could not.  Some industries refused to hire married 
women at all, thus giving women an incentive to delay marriage.32 Industrialization thus raised 
the opportunity cost of children in two ways.   
Several studies find that local employment opportunities for women lowered fertility.  
Crafts (1989) relies on the fertility and occupational information in the 1911 census of England 
and Wales. He finds a consistent, negative correlation between women’s local labor-force 
opportunities and marital fertility, with elasticities ranging from -.13 to -.34.  Studies such as 
Brown and Guinnane (2002), which uses both textile mills and the structure of local agriculture to 
proxy for women’s earnings opportunities, find small, statistically significant effects with the 
expected signs. Schultz (1985) uses a different approach that links women’s earnings 
opportunities to the fertility transition per se. Using time series-cross section data on Swedish 
counties for the period 1860-1910, he shows that the ratio of women’s to men’s wages explains 
about a quarter of the decline in Swedish fertility. He treats women’s earnings as endogenous, 
and instruments for them using demand-side shocks to agricultural prices. Women’s earnings 
                                                 
31 Kocka (1990, Table 16). This figure refers only to establishments with five or more employees. 
32 The “Lowell system” used by some textile mills in New England before the Civil War recruited young 
women to work in the mill and live in a special company boardinghouse under the supervision of a 
“housemother.” The point was to recruit farmers’ daughters who would otherwise be unwilling  to 
undertake factory work (Saxonhouse and Wright (1984, pp.4-5)). 
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depress fertility at virtually all ages, so this effect seems to work through more than delayed 
marriage.33 
 
Changes in the costs of and returns to child quality 
 Another appealing idea is that fertility decline reflects increases in the net return to child 
quality. There are two different questions to ask. First, did the cost of child quality, in the form of 
education, decline? Second, did the return to child quality increase? A positive answer to either 
question implies a substitution away from numbers towards child quality. Unfortunately we can 
say more about the former than the latter. 
Economic historians of education stress important distinctions in the types of 
economically useful education. One could acquire basic literacy and numeracy at home (if the 
parents were literate) or in primary school. More advanced education or training required 
secondary schools, formal apprenticeship, or on-the-job training. Tertiary education during the 
relevant period was restricted to a small elite, and while perhaps important for overall TFP 
growth, would not figure heavily in demographic decisions. 
The growth of literacy and its primary cause, public elementary education, differs 
dramatically across the countries on which we focus. There are two broad classes of important 
decisions: First, to make primary schooling universally available, and second, to make  it 
compulsory.. Prussia led the way with the 1763 requirement that all children aged five to thirteen 
attend primary schools. The schools were not free, but there was tuition assistance for the poor. 
Like many grand educational reforms, this measure’s implementation was resisted by various 
interests, and in any case Prussia lacked sufficient teachers for all the children in the territory 
                                                 
33 Wanamaker (2010) uses the introduction of textile mills in South Carolina in the period 1880-1900 to 
study the impact of changes in opportunity costs on family sizes. The introduction of a textile mill reduced 
fertility in the surrounding area by about 11 percent c. 1900. The effect reflects differential migration of 
low-fertility couples and so does not reflect a shift in the opportunity cost of childbearing in the sense of 
Becker’s model.  
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(Melton 1988, pp.174-177).34 In 1816, about 60 percent of students required to attend school 
actually did so, a figure rising to 82 percent by 1846. Some German states, such as Saxony, did 
better (Nipperdey (1994, p.463). Several U.S. states introduced free public elementary education 
starting in the 1840s, and for most of the nineteenth century the U.S was an outlier in the 
proportion of young people in school. Free, compulsory education came later to Germany (1872), 
France (1882), and England and Wales (1893) (Bruland 2003, pp. 160-161).  Easterlin (1981, 
Appendix Table 1) estimates that in 1850, there were 1800 children in primary schools per 10,000 
total population in the U.S., compared to 1600 in Germany, 930 in France, and 1045 in the United 
Kingdom.  
Literacy is both a broadly comparable measure of educational outcomes and the most 
economically useful output of primary schools. Mitch (2004, Tables 12.5A and 12.5B) reports 
that, in the time around 1860,  adult male illiteracy rates were about 35 percent in France, 30 
percent in England, 30 percent in the United States (whites only), and 5 percent in Prussia.  
Female illiteracy rates in these countries were higher: 45 percent for France, 37 percent for 
England, 10 percent for U.S. (whites only) and 5 percent for Prussia. The rapid development of 
schools in both Britain and France dramatically increased literacy rates by the end of the 
nineteenth century (Furet and Ozouf (1977, p.293)). 
The creation of schools certainly reduced the cost of elementary education. But the 
opportunity cost of the time spent in school remained, even when schools were free. Mitch (1992, 
p.156) quotes Horace Mann’s comment in the British 1851 census of education: “It is not for sake 
of saving a penny per week, but for the sake of gaining a shilling or eighteenpence a week that a 
child is transferred from the school to the factory.” Child-labor laws might have been more 
important for encouraging schooling than the schools themselves. 
                                                 
34 Economic historians of schooling stress that the quality of schools varied dramatically across time and 
place. The celebrated Prussian schools, for example, stressed the formation of Prussian citizens; thus 
instruction was weighted toward subjects such as religion. Primary school students learned to read and 
write, and some basic arithmetic, but more advanced skills were acquired in other ways (Nipperdey (1994, 
p.462)). 
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What were the returns to education? Historical sources usually report only literacy status, 
not years of education, and occupation rather than income or wage. So we cannot estimate returns 
to education as is in the modern literature on the economics of education. Goldin and Katz (2000) 
exploit the unique Iowa census of 1915 to provide one of the only historical estimates available. 
They find that the return to an additional year of high school or college then was, for males, on 
the order of 11-12 percent (Goldin and Katz (2000)). Mitch (1992, pp. 230-235) estimates the 
present value of acquiring literacy in Victorian Britain for a representative child. The present 
value of the cost of acquiring literacy  would be about £4. At a wage premium of 5 shillings per 
week for literacy, the present value of the higher wages for a 35-year work life would be over 
£200. 
Efforts to examine the relationship between children’s education and their parents’ 
fertility also confront data problems. Sources usually do not include both parental fertility and 
children’s educational attainment, which is what we need for direct tests of the Q-Q tradeoff. It 
would be tempting to interpret parental education as a proxy for children’s education. But this 
kind of effect can be interpreted in many different ways. The paper on Prussia discussed earlier 
(Becker et al (2009)) takes the preferred approach, which is to estimate the impact of school 
enrollment rates on fertility. Presumably this approach could be replicated in other contexts, using 
changes in schooling and child-labor rules to measure the net returns to education. 
 
Social insurance and old-age support  
 One particular return to child-rearing that receives considerable attention in the literature 
is children’s role in insuring parents against the consequences of accidents, ill-health, and old age. 
The most common argument is that children are a form of life-cycle savings; parents invest when 
they are young and healthy, and then expect their children to care for them in infirmity or old age. 
(The Sundstrom-David criticism of Easterlin’s model, noted above, is one version of this 
argument.) We should also consider insurance against accidents and ill-health. Two versions of 
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this argument have been advanced to explain the fertility transition. One is that industrialization 
and the increased mobility it entails, especially rural-to-urban migration, made it harder for 
parents to hold children to the intergenerational bargain. This “child default” argument implies 
that the developing industrial economy made children a less desirable vehicle for savings.35 A 
second version of the argument points to the development of substitute means of providing for 
old age, especially social insurance and the welfare state. 
 Both versions of the argument suffer from the problem that we know that economic ties 
between parents and children varied dramatically across the societies in question before the 
fertility transition. In some European regions, peasant households would draft formal documents 
that turned a farmstead over to the heir, and carefully specified the heir’s obligations to his 
parents (as well as to siblings to who had not yet received an inheritance). This Altenteil 
guaranteed specific transfers to the retired couple, who often lived on the farm in a special house 
reserved for that purpose.36 At the other extreme, rural laborers’ children in England would, from 
at least the early-modern period, leave home for good in their early to mid teens. The best 
evidence suggests these children had no further economic relationship with their parents 
(Macfarlane (1986, pp. 83-84)). Thus the extent to which parent-child ties changed during the 
nineteenth century varies a great deal. We should also note that the “child default” version of the 
argument resembles arguments about mortality (although in reverse): from the parents’ 
viewpoint, rising child default is like increased infant and child mortality. Parents’ might actually 
invest in more, lower-quality children to ensure that at least some children remained faithful. 
 This argument faces a different kind of challenge, which is that the social-insurance 
systems introduced at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century were usually replacing 
earlier schemes. Thus there is no clear “before.” Prior to the introduction of social insurance, 
                                                 
35 This would also be consistent with Caldwell’s changes in “net intergenerational wealth flows.” Carter et 
al (1994) invoke the child default argument in discussing the U.S. fertility transition. 
36 The practice goes by many names. There are clear references to it in Scandinavia and Ireland, but most 
would associate it with German-speaking Central Europe. See Guinnane (1997, pp. 149-151) for Ireland, 
Gjerde (1985) for Norway, and Gaunt (1983) for a survey of Northern and Central Europe. 
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every society in question here had some form of provision for the poor and those unable to 
provide for themselves because of illness or age. These “poor relief” systems were locally-
financed and organized, and were rarely as generous as the social-insurance schemes that 
eventually replaced them. Another important difference was their logic: poor relief systems were 
intended to relieve “need,” and so imposed asset tests. The numbers receiving relief at any one 
time were small, as one would expect. Hennock (2007, p.46-47) estimates that 6.6 percent of the 
English population and about 3.4 percent of the German population received poor relief in 1885. 
Social insurance, on the other hand, generally operated on insurance principles: covered 
individuals received specified payments triggered by specified events or conditions.37 
The literature divides social insurance into four categories: sickness insurance, 
(workplace) accident insurance, old age and disability insurance, and unemployment insurance. 
The first broad social-insurance system dates to 1883, when the German government introduced 
compulsory sickness insurance (1883) and then accident insurance (1884). Disability and old-age 
insurance were added in 1889, while unemployment insurance came later. The system’s 
introduction was less discrete than these dates imply. Some German workers were already 
covered by schemes that were compulsory for their industry, and that became the model for the 
system for which Bismarck is always credited. The sickness and accident-insurance programs 
covered only workers in selected industries at first, although coverage broadened rapidly.38 
Participation in the disability and old-age insurance program were limited by income. The United 
Kingdom’s Old Age Pensions Act (1908) illustrates a different approach. This non-contributory 
scheme was introduced for all persons who met a (mild) means test and had reached the age of 70 
                                                 
37 Many workers in the late nineteenth century were also covered by voluntary, private schemes that 
provided assistance in case of sickness, accident, or infirmity. Some individual employers and labor groups 
also created insurance programs that covered parts of the workforce. In Germany, some workers were 
obliged to join a particular insurance organization long before the introduction of formal social insurance. 
Guinnane and Streb (2010) discusses Friendly Societies and the German organizations. Murray (2007) 
discusses these organizations more broadly and provides references to the broader literature. 
38 Khoudor-Castéras (2008) reports that the health insurance law covered 21 percent of workers in 1885, 
rising to 44 percent in 1913. The accident insurance system at first covered 18 percent of workers, but by 
1913 covered 94 percent (Appendix Tables 1 and 2). 
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years. France and other Continental countries tended to emulate the German approach to social 
insurance, introducing first sickness and accident insurance, usually in the 1890s or later. There 
were earlier old-age pension systems, but they were voluntary and did not receive state subsidies, 
and were not widely used. The United States was an outlier: before the Social Security Act of 
1935, the U.S. had no social insurance per se. Local poor relief systems, war pensions, and 
mother’s pensions filled some of the role met by poor relief and social insurance in Europe. The 
“workman’s compensation” system introduced in the U.S. in the early twentieth century filled the 
role of German-style accident insurance (Fishback and Kantor (2000)). 
The timing of social insurance’s rise in Europe hints that it is part of the story of the 
fertility transition. We cannot identify a single date at which social insurance first appeared, 
however. On the other hand, with care one might track the extension of such programs to 
different parts of a national population, and look for the impact on fertility of changes in social 
insurance over time. The broad patterns also do not make it likely that social insurance alone is 
central to the story. The two forerunners, France and the United States, were laggards in 
developing social insurance 
 
4. Conclusions  
The historical fertility transition played a central role in the making of modern economies. 
This paper outlines the central empirical patterns in a selection of important, wealthy countries, 
and then provides an overview of the major economic explanations for the fertility transition. I 
caution at several points that apparently minor differences in demographic measures can make an 
important different to the patterns economists seek to explain. More generally, much of the 
relevant literature in this area was produced by demographers and others who sometimes use 
definitions that to economists are unfamiliar and perhaps surprising. These differences reward 
care in consuming that literature. 
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There are several different economic explanations for the historical fertility transition. Two 
doubtless played a role, but are easy to exaggerate. During the late nineteenth century 
technological change introduced the first widespread use of "modern" contraceptives such as 
condoms. Yet the imperfect evidence available suggests these methods were still expensive, and 
that most couples  continued to rely on "traditional" methods such as abstinence and withdrawal. 
Furthermore,  simulation models show that traditional methods were sufficiently effective to 
account for the fertility decline we observe. Another often-stressed explanation for fertility 
decline is the decline of mortality, especially infant and child mortality. Mortality decline 
probably played a role in the historical fertility decline, but I have stressed two caveats.In some 
countries fertility declined significantly before any real mortality decline. In addition, infant and 
child mortality are at least partially endogenous to fertility.  
The other explanations discussed here all work off relative price changes, as implied by 
Becker's demand-for-children model. Several significant changes in the relevant period plausibly 
altered the costs of and returns to children in ways that would reduce fertility. These include 
housing costs due to urbanization, changes in child-labor law, increases in the opportunity costs 
of child-bearing because of better labor-force opportunities for women, the introduction of free or 
compulsory primary education, and the development of social-insurance systems. 
Despite at least one hundred years of academic and official interest in the decline of 
fertility, this question is not one for which economists have a clear, empirically well-founded 
explanation. (This is not to say there are not many partial answers based on particular times or 
places, or many theoretical efforts that capture some important part of the process.) There are 
several reasons for the current state of the literature. The most important is extensive 
simultaneity:  the relevant period saw many significant economic changes, and some of these 
changes were tied to other changes such as the introduction of social insurance. Economists are 
well aware (and more recently, working hard on) the interrelations between fertility and the 
economy. But there remains the problem of understanding the role of any given change in a 
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period when many other important forces changed at the same time. This is of course partly a 
standard identification problem, and partly an issue of being able to invoke ceteris paribus 
reasoning. Both require much more careful empirical work than we presently have. 
Much more empirical work is both necessary and possible. The recent literature typically 
relies on national aggregates, or, in some cases, sub-national aggregate data. This approach 
sometimes reflects a reasonable trade-off between the costs and benefits of data collection. But 
for many historical economies there remain significant possibilities for using data much better-
suited to testing the hypotheses described. The most important unexploited sources are 
individual-level data, especially individual-level data that include wealth and income, or 
reasonable proxies for wealth and income (such as occupation). The latter point is crucial: we 
know relatively little about the historical fertility transition because much of the earlier research 
relied on sources that do not contain useful economic information. Individual-level information is 
important for several different reasons.  Sometimes data of this sort allows the researcher to 
follow life-cycle fertility, which permits use of a broader range of shocks to identify behavioral 
responses. Even when the sources are cross-sectional, individual-level data  supports tests of 
multivariate hypotheses. (With aggregate data, on the other hand, there are usually ecological 
inference problems with any multivariate hypothesis.) These empirical approaches require 
significant investment of researcher time and other resources, but hold out the promise of really 
understanding, for example, the effect of women's labor-force opportunities on the demand for 
children during the fertility transition. The recent upsurge in theoretical interest in the historical 
fertility transition will pay an even greater dividend if it motivates renewed interest in using the 
available data to understand the economics of the historical fertility transition. 
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Figure 2 
Fertility and mortality in Germany
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 Figure 3: Cohort fertility rates 
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French fertility, 1740-1910
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Figure 5: Fertility and the real wage in England 
5
6
7
8
9
W
a
g
e
 
1
1
-
y
e
a
r
 
M
A
2
5
3
0
3
5
4
0
C
B
R
 
1
1
-
y
e
a
r
 
M
A
1500 1600 1700 1800 1900
Year
CBR 11-year MA Wage 11-year MA
England, 1541-1871
Crude birth rates and real wages
 
Source: “Sources and notes for figures”  
41 
 
42 
 
 
Sources and notes for figures 
Figure 1 
 The figures are crude birth rates as reported in Mitchell (1980) 
Figure 2 
 Same as Figure 1 
Figure 3 
Source: Festy (1979; For England, p. 262, for France, pp. 266-7, for Italy, p. 283, for the US, p. 290, and for Germany, p.222.)  
 
Note: The cohort fertility rate is the mean number of children born to women belonging to the birth cohorts on the horizontal axis. The 
overlapping years are in the source. The precise birth cohorts vary slightly across countries. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 Source: Weir (1994). 
 
Note: “Fertility” is the Princeton index of overall fertility If ; marital fertility is the Princeton index Ig; extramarital fertility is the Princeton 
index Ih; and “marriage” is the Princeton index Im, which measures the contribution of changing marriage patterns to overall fertility, 
 
Figure 5 
Based on Wrigley and Schofield (1981, Figure 10.6) 
Note: This figure differs from Wrigley and Schofield (1981, Figure 10.1) in two ways. I plot the CBR, not the Gross Rate of 
Reproduction. The real wage index here is Robert Allen’s “labourers” index, rather than the Phelps Brown-Hopkins index. The series 
plotted are centered 11-year moving averages. Allen’s index can be found at: 
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/members/robert.allen/WagesPrices.htm 
 
